/* The church of Scientology has a long history in the courts.

Here is the latest in that continuing series. This opinion

discusses the case and controversy requirement of the U.S.

constitution. The case also provides an interesting look into the

attorney-client privilege. */

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be

released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the

time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of

the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of

Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v.

Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

Syllabus

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF CALIFORNIA v. UNITED STATES et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth

circuit No. 91-946. Argued October 6, 1992; Decided November 16,

1992

Pursuant to its jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. 402(b) and 7604(a), the District Court ordered a state-court Clerk to comply with a summons issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for the production of, inter alia, two tapes in the Clerk's custody recording conversations between officials of petitioner Church of Scientology (Church) and their attorneys. Although the Church filed a timely notice of appeal, its request for a stay of the summons enforcement order was unsuccessful, and copies of the tapes were delivered to the IRS while the appeal was pending. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot, ruling that no controversy existed because the tapes had already been turned over to the IRS. Held: Compliance with the summons enforcement order did not moot the Church's appeal. Delivery of the tapes to the IRS did not mandate dismissal by making it impossible for the Court of Appeals to grant the Church "any effectual relief." See Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653. Although it is now too late to prevent, or to provide a fully satisfactory remedy for, the invasion of privacy that occurred when the IRS obtained the information on the tapes, the Court of Appeals does have power to effectuate a partial remedy by ordering the Government to return or destroy any copies of the tapes that it may possess. Even if the Government is right that under 7402(b) and 7604(a) the jurisdiction of the district court is limited to those matters directly related to whether or not the summons should be enforced, the question presented here is whether there was jurisdiction in the appellate court to review the allegedly unlawful summons enforcement order. There is nothing in the Internal Revenue Code to suggest that Congress sought to preclude such review, and, indeed, this Court has expressly held that IRS

summons enforcement orders are subject to appellate review. See

Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449. Although several Courts of

Appeals have accepted the Government's argument in IRS enforcement proceedings, the force of that line of authority is

matched by a similar array of decisions reaching a contrary

conclusion in proceedings enforcing Federal Trade Commission

discovery requests. There is no significant difference between

the governing statutes that can explain the divergent interpretations, nor any reason to conclude that production of

records relevant to a tax investigation should have mootness

consequences that production of other business records does not

have. Pp.3-9. Vacated and remanded.

Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

[November 16, 1992]

Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.

Two tapes recording conversations between officials of the Church

of Scientology (Church) and their attorneys in July 1980 have

been the principal bone of contention in this, and two earlier,

legal proceedings.

In an action filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the

Church contended that the defendant had unlawfully acquired

possession of the tapes. Pending resolution of that action, the

state court ordered its Clerk to take custody of the tapes and

certain other documents.

In 1984, in connection with an investigation of the tax returns

of L. Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology, the

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sought access to the Church

documents in the state-court Clerk's possession. After the Clerk

was served with an IRS summons, he permitted IRS agents to

examine and make copies of the tapes. Thereafter, in a federal

action initiated by the Church in the Central District of

California, the District Court entered a temporary restraining

order directing the IRS to file its copies of the tapes, and all

related notes, with the federal court. Those copies were

subsequently returned to the Clerk of the state court.

On January 18, 1985, the IRS commenced this proceeding by filing

a petition to enforce the summons that had previously been served

on the state-court Clerk. The Church intervened and opposed

production of the tapes on the ground that they were protected by

the attorney-client privilege. After protracted proceedings,

including review in this Court, see United States v. Zolin, 491

U. S. 554 (1989), on April 15, 1991, the District Court entered

an order enforcing compliance with the summons. The Church filed

a timely notice of appeal and unsuccessfully sought a stay of

that order. While the appeal was pending, copies of the tapes

were delivered to the IRS. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals

ordered the Church to show cause why its appeal should not be

dismissed as moot. After briefing on the mootness issue, the

Court dismissed the appeal. It explained:

Because it is undisputed that the tapes have been turned over to

the IRS in compliance with the summons enforcement order, no

controversy exists presently and this appeal is moot. United

States v. Zolin, No. CV 85-0440 (CA9, Sept. 10, 1991). We granted

the Church's petition for certiorari to consider the narrow

question whether the appeal was properly dismissed as moot. 503

U. S. _______(1992).

I

It has long been settled that a federal court has no authority

to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or

to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the

matter in issue in the case before it. Mills v. Green, 159 U. S.

651, 653 (1895). See also Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401

(1975); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971). For

that reason, if an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal

that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual

relief whatever to a prevailing party, the appeal must be

dismissed. Mills, 159 U. S., at 653. In this case, after the

Church took its appeal from the April 15 order, in compliance

with that order copies of the tapes were delivered to the IRS.

The Government contends that it was thereafter impossible for the

Court of Appeals to grant the Church any effectual relief. We

disagree.

While a court may not be able to return the parties to the status

quo ante " here is nothing a court can do to withdraw all

knowledge or information that IRS agents may have acquired by

examination of the tapes" a court can fashion some form of

meaningful relief in circumstances such as these.

/* That may not necessarily be true. The Court could order all of

those persons who heard the tape be barred from working on the

case. Like the exclusionary rule in criminal matters, the Court

could also limit the use of information received by means of the

"fruit of the poisonous tree. *.

Taxpayers have an obvious possessory interest in their records.

When the Government has obtained such materials as a result of an

unlawful summons, that interest is violated and a court can

effectuate relief by ordering the Government to return the

records. Moreover, even if the Government retains only copies of

the disputed materials, a taxpayer still suffers injury by the

Government's continued possession of those materials, namely, the

affront to the taxpayer's privacy. A person's interest in

maintaining the privacy of his papers and effects is of

sufficient importance to merit constitutional protection.

Indeed, that the Church considers the information contained on

the disputed tapes important is demonstrated by the long,

contentious history of this litigation. Even though it is now

too late to prevent, or to provide a fully satisfactory remedy

for, the invasion of privacy that occurred when the IRS obtained

the information on the tapes, a court does have power to

effectuate a partial remedy by ordering the Government to destroy

or return any and all copies it may have in its possession. The

availability of this possible remedy is sufficient to prevent

this case from being moot.

The Government argues, however, that these basic principles are

inapplicable in IRS summons enforcement proceedings because of

the particular nature of the statute governing such proceedings.

Reasoning from the premise that federal courts are empowered to

consider only those matters within their jurisdiction, the

Government argues that in IRS summons enforcement proceedings the

subject-matter jurisdiction of the District Court is limited to

determining only whether the court should compel ". . .

production of the information requested by the summons." 26 U.

S. C. 7402(b), 7604(a). See n. 4, supra. Once the court has

answered that question and compliance has occurred, there is

nothing more for the District Court to decide and the

jurisdiction of the District Court evaporates.

We think the Government misconceives the inquiry in this case.

The Government may or may not be right that under 7402(b) and

7604(a) the jurisdiction of the District Court is limited to those

matters directly related to whether or not the summons should be

enforced. Indeed, the scope of the District Court's jurisdiction

under those provisions was the issue over which this Court

deadlocked in United States v. Zolin, 491 U. S. 554 (1989). The

question presented in the current incarnation of this case is

whether there was jurisdiction in the appellate court to review

the allegedly unlawful summons enforcement order. On that

question, the Government's elaborate statutory argument is

largely irrelevant. There is nothing in the statute to suggest

that Congress sought to preclude appellate review of district

court enforcement orders. To the contrary, we have expressly

held that IRS summons enforcement orders are subject to appellate

review. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U. S. 440, 449 (1964). Thus,

whether or not there is jurisdiction in the appellate court to

review the District Court's order turns not on the subject matter

of Congress' jurisdictional grant to the district courts, but on

traditional principles of justiciability, namely, whether an

intervening event has rendered the controversy moot. And, as we

have already explained, this case is not moot because if the

summons were improperly issued or enforced a court could order

that the IRS' copies of the tapes be either returned or

destroyed.

/* Since "some relief" could be granted, the court unanimously

finds that the case remains a "case or controversy" subject to

decision. */

II

We recognize that several Courts of Appeals have accepted the

Government's argument in IRS enforcement proceedings, but the

force of that line of authority is matched by a similar array of

decisions reaching a contrary conclusion in proceedings enforcing

Federal Trade Commission discovery requests. There is no

significant difference between the governing statutes that can

explain the divergent interpretations. Nor is there any reason

to conclude that production of records relevant to a tax

investigation should have mootness consequences that production

of other business records does not have. Moreover, in construing

these provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, the Court has

considered it appropriate to rely on its earlier cases involving

other statutes, including the Federal Trade Commission Act. See

United States v. Powell, 379 U. S. 48, 57 (1964) (citing United

States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 642!643 (1950)).

We therefore conclude that the appeal was improperly dismissed as

moot. In so concluding we express no opinion on the merits of

the Church's argument that the Government did not establish an

adequate evidentiary basis to support the District Court's

determination that the tapes fell within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. Nor do we express

any opinion about the res judicata contention advanced in the

Government's brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari.

Brief for United States in Opposition 13-14. We simply hold that

compliance with the summons enforcement order did not moot the

Church's appeal. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.